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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AT AND BEFORE THE
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
INTRODUCTION
Nowhere, perhaps, are the limits and defects of the Cal-
ifornia criminal discovery system more marked or glaring than
when discovery is sought for some purpose other than trial pre-
paration. Both discovery by a defendant and disclosure by the
prosecutor are founded on "the fundamental principle that an
accused is entitled to a fair trial."' A defendant is required to
explain his need for information on that basis, but the further from
the trial he finds himself the less compelling is his need. The
rationale of trial preparation appears to break down completely
prior to the preliminary examination.
Since California criminal discovery is a "judicially created
doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation,"2 its limits
1. Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407, 408 (1959).
2. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 535-36, 522 P.2d 305, 308,
113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974).
However, the Staff of the Penal Code Revision Project has lately recom-
mended enactment of three pretrial discovery statutes. PENAL CODE REVISION
PROJECr, CAL. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMI'ITEE FOR REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE,
THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE §§ 10001-03 (Staff Draft 1975). If enacted,
these statutes would mark the first legislative foray into the criminal discovery
area.
Unfortunately, because the draft attempts in a very abbreviated fashion to
"freeze" the current state of criminal discovery law in inflexible and relatively per-
manent legislative prose, the statutory recommendations are worse than nothing.
California discovery law is incomplete and hardly ready for enshrinement. As
examples of areas neglected by the Staff Draft, there is no provision for discovery
by deposition; only limited use of self-executing provisions; a very incomplete list
of items which the prosecutor is required to provide to the defendant; no mention
of disclosure or the prosecutorial duty of candor; no statutory recognition of the
prosecutor's duty to disclose substantial, material; evidence favorable to the ac-
cused; little or no reflection in the text of the statutes of the careful limits on
discovery by the prosecution specified in Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970); and no requirement that discov-
ery be a continuing obligation. Although the COmments do touch on some of
the areas named above, the text of the draft appears to rely on the very general
language of section 10001 (b) to cover all bases:
(b) For good cause shown, the court may order the prosecuting at-
torney to make additional information available to the defendant.
Id. § 10001(b).
To the extent that the statutory draft reflects current law, it is superfluous
and an unwise attempt to check the development of a comprehensive discovery
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are ill-defined. Among the occasional appellate guideposts no
case can be found which grants discovery before the preliminary,
and the appellate courts usually have denied discovery when it was
sought at that hearing. As a consequence, most defense attorneys
are under the erroneous impression that, informal mechanisms
aside,3 discovery begins only when a defendant has been held to
answer by a magistrate or indicted by a grand jury.
This view has not been discouraged by the courts, though
they have never expressly held that discovery at or before the pre-
liminary is unavailable. As Justice Traynor wrote in 1964,
[t]he reasons -that militate against wholesale writs of review
[meretricious and time-consuming challenges vitiate the value
of discovery] also militate against a right ;to discovery before
the preliminary hearing except in the unusual situation where
it would enable the defendant to establish at the hearing that
the prosecution's case is without foundation. We have
accordingly discouraged such discovery in the usual situation
in California by denying petitions for writs to compel discov-
ery before the preliminary hearing.4
Consequently, the attitude prevails among judges and attorneys
that such discovery as a defendant might obtain at or before his
preliminary is incidental to the other functions of the preliminary,
and not mandated except as necessary to pretrial preparation.5
But reasons for discovery other than trial preparation exist,
and the principle that discovery aids in the ascertainment of truth
applies with equal validity to these nontrial functions. Where the
consequence to an innocent defendant is the "degradation and the
expense of a criminal trial,"6 the state should have no interest in
committing a defendant "on the testimony of witnesses who have
not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly im-
peached as the evidence permits."'7  The argument for discovery
doctrine. To the extent that the statutory draft omits mention of areas of crimi-
nal discovery not yet part of California law, it is shortsighted and ill-considered.
For an example of what could have been done, see VERMONT RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 15, 16, 16.1, 16.2 and 17 (1974).
3. For a full listing of such devices, see 1 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M.
MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 266 (3d ed.
1974).
4. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 228, 246 n.98 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Tupper v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 263, 331 P.2d 977 (1958);
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 48 (1958); People v. Supe-
rior Court (Simmons), 264 Cal. App. 2d 694, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968); cf. Peo-
ple v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 246-47, 384 P.2d 16, 29, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 437(1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1964) (right to counsel denied at "purely in-
vestigative" pretrial stages).
6. See People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 504, 354 P.2d 225, 229, 6 Cal. Rptr.
753, 757 (1960); Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (1941).
7. See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
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at or before the preliminary could hardly be framed better than
by the argument made for pretrial discovery in an early case. The
rationale is equally applicable:
The need for [discovery] to insure the ascertainment of the
facts in a trial fair to defendant and state alike is obvious.
In preparing any defense considerable attention is given to
cross-examination. Since cross-examination has been de-
scribed as the foremost legal engine ever invented for discov-
ering truth, the time consumed thereby is well spent and the
state's interest in ascertaining truth is also vindicated. One
aspect of cross-examination is to produce or extract facts
which diminish the personal trustworthiness of the witness.
Included as a method of diminishing trustworthiness is im-
peachment, and therefore, it too is a necessary part of pre-
paring a defense. Thus, as a matter pertaining to the de-
fense, petitioner is entitled to compel production of the docu-
ments for his use in cross-examining the witnesses on the
substance of their previous statements. 8
By reviewing certain relevant cases against the background
of current pretrial discovery procedure, this comment will show
that the trial court has discretion to grant discovery, both at and
before the preliminary examination, provided that as part of an
appropriate showing the defendant can establish a need for dis-
covery relevant to the preliminary rather than to trial.
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PROCEDURE
California pretrial criminal discovery has developed along
two different lines-discovery and disclosure. In practice these
doctrines may be similar in effect and content, but the terms de-
note differing premises and differing procedures. Though the
terms are often confused and used interchangeably, they are not
the same.
Discovery refers to information given to a defendant in re-
sponse to his motion and compelled by the court in the exercise
of its discretion because discovery is needed and justified. Dis-
closure, to use the term in a purist sense, relates to information
given to a defendant by the prosecutor in response to his duty;
that duty derives from the vital nature of the information rather
than court intervention. Since both discovery and disclosure stem
from the requirement that every defendant be given a fair trial,
their function is the same: to effect an exchange of information
to redress a balance of resources unfairly tipped in the prosecutor's
favor. The procedures, limits and conditions under which a de-
8. Tupper v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 263, 269-70, 331 P.2d 977, 980-
81 (1958) (Carter, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted). ,
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fendant can claim the benefits of this exchange will be specified
in this section of the comment so as to indicate the type of show-
ing that must be made for discovery at or before the preliminary
examination.
Criminal Discovery Procedure
"Discovery is designed to ascertain the truth .... -9 and
"is based on the fundamental principle that the accused is entitled
to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in the light of all relevant
and reasonably accessible information.' 0
9. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 58, 372 P.2d 919, 920, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 880 (1962).
This comment will not deal with discovery by the prosecution, but will focus
on discovery by the defendant. Most procedural rules applicable to a defendant
will also apply, with further restrictions, to the prosecution.
California law in the area of prosecutorial discovery is stated in Prudhomme
v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). The
California Supreme Court, relying upon the emphasis placed by the United States
Supreme Court on the role of the fifth amendment in protecting the rights of the
accused, the difficult experience of California courts in attempting to find a bal-
ance between interests of efficiency and the rights of the defendant, and a concern
that too much access to defense-generated information effectively works to shift
the burden of proof, held:
A reasonable demand for factual information which . . . pertains to
a particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that information
which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no sub-
stantial hazards of self-incrimination and therefore justify the trialjudge in determining that under the facts and circumstances in the case
before him it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly tend to
incriminate defendant. However, unless those criteria are met, dis-
covery should be refused.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The United States Supreme Court rejected this analysis and conclusion in the
case of United States v. Nobles, 43 U.S.L.W. 4815 (U.S. June 23, 1975). In an
opinion characterized by a narrow holding couched in language of very broad im-
plication, the Court granted prosecutorial discovery at trial of a defense investiga-
tor's report containing statements of third persons. The Court rejected a fifth
amendment objection, because the privilege is personal; a Rule 16 objection, be-
cause the rule is applicable only to pretrial process; a work-product argument, be-
cause defendant waived the privilege by putting the investigator on the stand; an
abuse-of-discretion argument, because the trial judge's order was properly limited;
and a sixth amendment argument, because the defendant is not entitled to present
a possible half-truth. Id.
By ignoring Prudhomme, the Court exhibited either Federal arrogance toward
the States, or an incomplete knowledge of relevant legal experience in the area.
The Court failed entirely to consider the effect of prosecutorial discovery on the
burden of proof, choosing to base its view on such elementary precepts as, for
example, "The dual aim of our criminal justice system is 'that guilt shall not es-
cape or innocence suffer,' " and, " 'The ends of criminal justice would be defeated
if judgments were to be founded on a partial and speculative presentation of
facts.'" Id. at 4817. As the Court itself stated, "Like many generalizations in
constitutional law, this one is too broad." Id. at 4818. The rules of evidence
are replete with examples of limitation of information in the interests of justice.
Fortunately for California defendants, the California Constitution provides
an independent source of protection for their rights.
10. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 522 P.2d 305, 308, 113
Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974); Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d
407, 408 (1959).
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
Utilizing this principle, the California courts have evolved a
procedure for obtaining pretrial discovery which links three fac-
tors: (1) unavailing effort to secure information; (2) showing of
plausible justification for court intervention; and (3) sound judi-
cial discretion. If, in the court's judgment, discovery is necessary
to insure a fair trial, and the defendant has made an adequate
showing of that need or justification, the court can compel pro-
duction of all relevant and material information in the possession
of the prosecution."
Where a defendant cannot readily obtain needed information
by his own efforts,'" including an informal request to the party
possessing it," he should make a formal demand on the prosecu-
tor.' 4  If the prosecutor refuses," the defendant may by timely
motion petition the court to order discovery in the interests of
justice. 1" If he is able to make the minimal showing required,
he will ordinarily be entitled to any unprivileged evidence and to
information which might lead to the discovery of evidence, pro-
vided that it appears reasonable to the court that such evidence
will assist him in preparing his defense. 17  This required
showing of need may be satisfied by general allegations which
establish some cause other than a 'mere desire' for the benefit of
the product of the prosecution's investigation.'" The defendant,
given his circumstances, must articulate some "plausible justifica-
tion" for inspection." Absent such showing, the court cannot
11. See People v. Chapman, .52 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (1959).
12. Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 819, 518 P.2d 1353, 1357, 112
Cal. Rptr. 257, 261 (1974); see Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 537,
522 P.2d 305, 309, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974); Ballard v. Superior Court,
64 Cal. 2d 159, 167, 410 P.2d 838, 843, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1966).
13. See People v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 694, 699, 70 Cal. Rptr.
480, 483 (1968); Yannacone v. Municipal Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 72, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 838 (1963); cf. Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 167-68, 410 P.2d
838, 843, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1966).
14. People v. Hauser, 206 Cal. App. 2d 272, 23 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1962).
If evidence is substantial, material and favorable to the accused, no request
is necessary since the prosecution has a constitutional duty to voluntarily disclose
such evidence. People v. Ruthford, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341, 121 Cal. Rptr.
261 (1975); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1971). All other information must be obtained by appropriate discovery proce-
dure, including demand.
15. People v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 694, 699, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480,
483 (1968).
16. Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 112 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1974); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 708, 312 P.2d 698, 700
(1957); see People v. Norman, 177 Cal. App. 2d 59, 1 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1960).
17. Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 112 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1974).
18. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 537, 522 P.2d 305, 309, 113
Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974).
19. Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 167, 410 P.2d 838, 843, 49
Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1966); see Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 89, 501
P.2d 234, 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 234 (1972).
1975]
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determine if it is reasonably possible that the information would
be helpful to his defense;20 it therefore has discretion to deny
his motion.2 1
The defendant must describe the requested information with
"at least some degree of specificity '22 adequate to preclude a
"fishing expedition. ' 23  Through these specifics the court can de-
termine the degree of attenuation or nexus to the crime, the
"quality of the vantage point" of a witness, or other criteria used
to measure the value of the information to the defendant. 24  Ab-
sent sufficient specificity, the court has discretion to deny discov-
ery. 2 5
It appears to be at least good practice for the defendant to
show possession or control of the requested information by a law
enforcement agency,- and it is probably necessary to show that
due diligence has been exercised to obtain it by his own efforts.27
Early decisions limited discovery to relevant and material informa-
tion,28 and this rule appears to remain in force at least with re-
ference to discovery of material witnesses and informers. 29  But
the rule has sometimes been given a relaxed interpretation. Some
recent cases have indicated that it is sufficient for a defendant to
demonstrate merely a reasonable possibility that desired informa-
tion might result in his exoneration,30 or simply that it may throw
20. People v. Sewell, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1039, 83 Cal. Rptr. 895, 897
(1970).21. Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 817, 518 P.2d 1353, 1356, 112
Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1974); Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 804, 478
P.2d 26, 30-31, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598-99 (1970).
22. Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 167, 410 P.2d 838, 843, 49
Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1966).
23. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 538, 522 P.2d 305, 309, 113
Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974).
24. See Williams v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 412, 421, 423-24, 112
Cal. Rptr. 485, 489, 491, as modified on denial of rehearing (1974) (Richardson,
P.J.).
25. Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 817, 518 P.2d 1353, 1356, 112
Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1974).
26. See People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (1959).
27.. See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 537, 522 P.2d 305, 309,
113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974); Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 817-19,
518 P.2d 1353, 1356-57, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260-61 (1974); Yannacone v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 72, 74, 34 Cal. Rptr. 838, 839 (1963); Vetter
v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 132, 136, 10 Cal. Rptr. 890, 892 (1961);
cf. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., dissent-
ing). But see United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 1972) (lack
of due diligence not sufficient to bar obligation of prosecutor to disclose).
28. E.g., People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (1959).
29. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 78, 501 P.2d 234, 241-42, 104
Cal. Rptr. 226, 233-34 (1972); People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 836, 434 P.2d
366, 370, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1967); People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802,
808, 330 P.2d 33, 36 (1958).30. People v. Borunda, 11 Cal. 3d 523, 522 P.2d 1, 113 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1974); see People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 840, 434 P.2d 366, 372, 64 Cal.
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light on issues in the case;" but the safer practice is to show what-
ever materiality and relevance exists.32
The defendant need not show the admissibility of the infor-
mation he seeks, 33 the authenticity of a statement, 34 inconsistentcy
between that statement and testimony, or any fact sought to be
established by discovery. 6 He need not prove the existence of
information3 7 (but should show its custody or control, if it does
exists8). He need not show that a witness, if discovered, would
give testimony favorable to him; 9 he need assert no more than a
good faith intent to call the witness. 40
Once discovery occurs, there is normally no continuing obli-
gation to disclose.41 And where a witness is uncooperative, a de-
fendant is limited to existing statements or testimony, because
there is no formal or compulsory deposition mechanism. 42
Discretion as a Limit on Discovery
The defendant's access to information, however, is always
Rptr. 110, 116 (1967); Williams v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 412, 419,
112 Cal. Rptr. 485, 488, as modified on denial of rehearing (1974).
31. See People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 228, 235, 113 Cal. Rptr. 303,
308 (1974); cf. Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 709, 312 P.2d 698,
701 (1957); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
32. This showing of materiality in support of a motion for discovery must
be distinguished from the showing of materiality required by disclosure procedure.
It is the duty of the prosecution,
even in the absence of a request therefor, to disclose all substantial ma-
terial evidence favorable to an accused, whether such evidence relates di-
rectly to the question of guilt, to matters relevant to punishment, or to
the credibility of a material witness.
People v. Ruthford, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 406, 534 P.2d 1341, 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr.
261, 266 (1975) (emphasis omitted). Where such evidence is not disclosed, the
defendant must then make a showing of "substantial materiality" to support his
motion for a new trial. Id. at 15. See text accompanying notes 60-82 infra.
33. Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 806, 478 P.2d 26, 32, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 594, 600 (1970); People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349 P.2d 964, 973,
3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157 (1960).
34. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 424, 340 P.2d 593, 594 (1959).
35. People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 716, 355 P.2d 641, 641-42, 7 Cal. Rptr.
897, 897-98 (1960); People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428, 430
(19.59).
36. People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 778, 505 P.2d 537, 543, 106 Cal. Rptr.
113, 119 (1973); People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 773, 401 P.2d 934, 936, 44
Cal. Rptr. 326, 328 (1965).
37. Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 817, 518 P.2d 1353, 1356, 112
Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1974).
38. See People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (1959).
39. See cases cited note 36 supra.
40. Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal, 3d 797, 806 n.6, 478 P.2d 26, 32 n.6,
91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 n.6 (1970).
41. See cases cited note 58 infra.
42. A deposition may be compelled only for the purpose of preserving testi-
mony where a witness is expected to be unable to attend the trial, or to obtain
testimony from out-of-state witnesses. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1335-45, 1349-62
(West 1970). See Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 12 Cal. Rptr.
191 (1961). For recent developments in this area, see text accompanying notes
100-104 infra.
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subject to sound judicial discretion. 41 His right to discovery is
conditioned upon a judicial balancing of the consequences both
to the public and himself." The court's wide discretion to deny
discovery permits it to guard against any adverse effects, 4 but
at least where discovery is found to be needed by the defendant
and necessary for a fair trial, the balance must be struck in favor
of the defendant.40
The court may, and should, excise unrelated parts of dis-
covered material where disclosure of that information would inter-
fere with effective law enforcement.47 Every court has the
inherent power, by summary means, to prevent frustration, abuse
or disregard of its process,48 and it appears empowered to issue
protective orders to control use and misuse of compelled dis-
covery.49 It can also impose whatever sanctions, including dis-
missal, as are appropriate to the circumstances.50  And, of course,
the court can deny discovery entirely if the defendant's showing
is inadequate, if his justification is insufficient, or if disclosure
would have adverse effect upon a legitimate governmental in-
terest.5 In the latter event, the court must make such order or
finding of fact as is required in the interests of justice regarding
the matter to which the privileged information is material.52
43. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 522 P.2d 305, 308, 113
Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974); Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 816, 518 P.2d
1353, 1355, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257, 259 (1974).
44. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 538-39, 522 P.2d 305, 310,
113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902 (1974).
45. Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 804, 478 P.2d 26, 30-31, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 594, 598-99 (1970).
46. People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 777, 505 P.2d 537, 542, 106 Cal. Rptr.
113, 118 (1973). See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9 (1973).
47. In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 223, 397 P.2d 1001, 1004, 42 Cal. Rptr.
9, 12 (1965).
48. People v. Eggers, 30 Cal. 2d 676, 185 P.2d 1 (1947); Fairchild v. Su-
perior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d 113, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1966); Neal v. Bank of
America N.T. & S.A., 93 Cal. App. 2d 678, 209 P.2d 825 (1949).
49. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 128(8) (West 1954) provides:
Every court shall have power:
(8) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
See Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 804, 478 P.2d 26, 30-31, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 594, 598-99 (1970); People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 245-46, 384 P.2d 16,
28-29, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 436-37 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1965);
People v. Eggers, 30 Cal. 2d 676, 692, 185 P.2d 1, 10 (1947).
50. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 650, .527 P.2d 361, 368, 117 Cal. Rptr.
9, 16 (1974); Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 541, 522 P.2d 305, 312,
113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 904 (1974) (Clark, J., concurring).
51. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 538, 522 P.2d 305, 309-10,
113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901-02 (1974); Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 817,
518 P.2d 1353, 1356, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1974); Joe Z. v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d 797, 804, 478 P.2d 26, 30, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (1970).
52. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1042(a) (West 1966) provides:
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
However, certain limits on discretion exist or are taking form.
Sheer arbitrary exercise of discretion without reasonable basis is
a violation of due process. Further, discretion may not be exer-
cised to deny a defendant a reasonable opportunity to prepare his
defense without thereby denying him a substantial right.53  If the
defendant is denied a substantial right, an appellate court abuses
its discretion by refusing to issue mandamus to the lower court
to give him an appropriate remedy.,4
Need as a Limit on Discretion
An additional factor which limits the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion is the "need" or "justification" advanced for compelling
discovery. In a given situation, a particular "need" may be so
insubstantial as to bar discovery, or conversely, may be so compel-
Except where disclosure is forbidden by an act of the Congress of the
United States, if a claim of privilege under this article by the state or
a public entity in this state is sustained in a criminal proceeding, the
presiding officer shall make such order or finding of fact adverse to the
public entity bringing the proceeding as is required by law upon any is-
sue in the proceeding to which the privileged information is material.
People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 650, 527 P.2d 361, 368, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 16
(1974); see Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 539, 541, 522 P.2d 305,
310, 312, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902, 904 (1974).
53. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 875-76, 880, 428 P.2d 304,
309-10, 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 445-46, 448 (1967); People v. Iocca, 37 Cal. App.
3d 73, 79-80, 112 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105-06 (1974).
The "substantial right" is a common law notion which embodies the standard
of reasonableness said to be present in the common law. It reflects social con-
cepts of what is just and right. "Substantive rights are those existing for their
own sake and constituting the normal legal order of society, i.e., rights of life,
liberty, property, and reputation." In re Gogabashvele's Estate, 195 Cal. App. 2d
503, 525, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77, 90 (1961). Further, "'[t]he forms of procedure re-
quired by law . . . establish a substantial right vested in every person charged
with crime and should not be lightly waived aside.'" People v. Elliot, 54 Cal.
2d 498, 503, 354 P.2d 225, 228, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 756 (1960), quoting with ap-
proval People v. Brooks, 72 Cal. App. 2d 657, 661, 165 P.2d 51, 53 (1946).
Substantial rights have been found in California in numerous contexts, in-
cluding the preliminary examination. See, e.g., the "rights" collected in Jennings
v. Superior Court, supra at 874-75, 428 P.2d at 309, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
"[W]here it appears that, during the course of the preliminary examination, the
defendant has been denied a substantial right, the commitment is unlawful .... "
Id. at 874, 428 P.2d at 308-09, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45 (emphasis omitted).
Rights pertinent to the preliminary examination include, for example, exercise of
judicial discretion "in such manner as [will not] deprive the defendant of a rea-
sonable opportunity to prepare his defense." Id. at 876, 428 P.2d at 309-10, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 445-46. Where the subject of cross-examination at the preliminary
hearing concerns the matter at issue, or the questioning tends to overcome or
qualify the effect of the testimony given on direct examination, refusal to permit
such questioning results in the denial of a substantial right. Id. at 877, 879, 428
P.2d at 310-11, 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47, 448. Similarly, denial of a continu-
ance of the preliminary in order that an informer material to a potentially valid
entrapment defense can be located deprives a defendant of a substantial right.
People v. Iocca, supra.
54. Dowell v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 483, 304 P.2d 1009 (1956).
1975]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
ling as to confer discovery as a routine matter of practice. The
procedure nonetheless requires, at least in principle, a case-by-
case decision by the judge based on the unique merits of the par-
ticular showing and circumstances. But as Justice Richardson ad-
mitted in Williams v. Superior Court,"' speculation concerning the
possible value of information can be as wide-ranging as the in-
genuity of defense counsel, and as a result a lengthy list of "needs"
have been found to be "plausible justifications."5 6 Once so recog-
nized by an appellate court, or established by practice, such needs
tend to lose their connection to particular circumstances and be-
come accepted as generally sufficient. The real scope of judicial
discretion is effectively limited by this process.
The range of information discoverable on such justifications
is limited only by privilege or the constitutional rights of others.
However, the procedural rules governing discovery normally vary
with the nature of the information sought, for example, statements
of codefendants, physical evidence, experts' reports, witnesses'
statements, informers' identities, and so forth. The procedural
rules described heretofore have overall applicability when discovery
is sought, but the attorney is cautioned to consult case law for de-
tailed peculiarities pertinent to the information he seeks.5 7  He
is also cautioned that neither an order nor denial of discovery is
necessarily continuing, and it is good practice to renew all motions
for discovery immediately before trial.58
Disclosure by the Prosecution
A second doctrine by which discovery of evidence is ra-
55. 38 Cal. App. 3d 412, 421, 112 Cal. Rptr. 485, 490, as modified on denial
of rehearing (1974).
56. See, e.g., Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113
Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974) (need to refresh recollection of defendant or his witness;
to enable cross-examination; to show character evidence in support of affirmative
defense; to identify from "rap sheet" the probable true aggressor; to cast light on
the issues); Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr.
594 (1970) (need to determine voluntary character of defendant's statement; to
determine admissibility; to determine impact of precise words on trier of fact; to
determine prejudicial effect; to determine accuracy; to determine completeness; to
gauge relevance to possible penalty; to determine advisability of a motion to sever;
to enable rigorous cross-examination and impeachment); People v. Johnson, 38
Cal. App. 3d 228, 113 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1974) (need to identify possible defense
witnesses from among experts who will not be called by the prosecution; to cross-
examine and impeach an expert; to argue more vigorously failure to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt).
57. For a useful compendium of evidentiary items which can be discovered,
and relevant cases, see J. DEMEO, CALnroRNiA DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY PRAC-
TcE §§ 16.16-16.25 (1971).
58. People v. Briggs, 58 Cal. 2d 385, 374 P.2d 257, 24 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1962);
People v. Bazaure, 235 Cal. App. 2d 21, 44 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1965); see People
v. Gallegos, 180 Cal. App. 2d 274, 4 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1960); People v. Sauer, 163
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tionalized is disclosure. Disclosure, as noted earlier,59 differs
from discovery in important respects. It is a constitutional re-
quirement, rather than a policy doctrine, and is therefore manda-
tory, and not discretionary. The prosecutor must act on his own
initiative without court intervention, and the burden is on him to
show privilege or exemption rather than on the defendant to show
justification.
Fundamentally, disclosure stems from a prosecution duty of
candor.60 The prosecutor is obligated fully and fairly to present
all evidence material to the charge, and adversary considerations
must give way. 61 He must disclose,
even in the absence of a request therefor, ... all substantial
material evidence favorable to an accused, whether such evi-
dence relates directly to the question of guilt, to matters rele-
vant to punishment, or to the credibility of a material
witness.62
But the mere fact of "duty" does not afford the defendant
a remedy if disclosure is in fact not made. Only where evidence
which should be disclosed is "suppressed" will he succeed in a
claim of violation of due process. 63 The courts will find "suppres-
sion" only if several other requirements have been met.
The latest authoritative federal formulation of these require-
ments, Moore v. Illinois,64 held that the "heart" of disclosure doc-
trine is prosecutorial suppression of evidence in the face of a de-
fense request, where the evidence is favorable to the defendant
and material either to guilt or punishment. Thus, the basic pre-
conditions to remedy under federal law are (1) suppression by
the prosecution, (2) after a request from the defendant, (3) for
evidence favorable to the defendant, (4) which is material either
to guilt or punishment.
Cal. App. 2d 740, 329 P.2d 962 (1958). But see People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d
771, 782 n.8, 505 P.2d 537, 545 n.8, 106 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121 n.8 (1973).
59. See text preceding note 9 supra.
60. United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 1972); Jackson v.
Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1968); see Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 153 (1971); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
61. In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 531, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96 Cal. Rptr.
594, 598 (1971).
62. People v. Ruthford, Crim. 18431, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 406, 534 P.2d 1341,
1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261, 266 (1975) (emphasis omitted). This duty of dis-
closure is also operative as a duty of preservation, requiring the prosecution to
make reasonable efforts to preserve material evidence. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal.
3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
63. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
64. 408 U.S. 786 (1972); accord, People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d
361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
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Though the formula is simple, the courts have been reluctant
to apply it, and have sought additional criteria which could justify
excusing the prosecutor from his lapse. Perhaps because the
sanction for suppression is so severe-a conviction must fall, a
charge be dismissed"'-the federal courts have narrowly con-
strued the doctrine. They have looked to factors such as negligent
rather than deliberate nondisclosure, or the prosecutor's lack of
knowledge that testimony was false, to find a reason to uphold a
conviction. 6 This narrow construction persists,67 but a few courts
have based a finding of suppression simply on the prosecution's
duty of candor and considerations of fairness.68
California echoed this standard in People v. Hitch,69 but the
California courts have elsewhere supplied qualifications of terms
which ease the defendant's plight.
First, the accused has been relieved of any initial burden of
claiming disclosure. Though Hitch cited the "settled rule" that
intentional suppression of material evidence favorable to a defend-
ant "who has requested it" constitutes violation of due process,7"
the recent case of People v. Ruthford71 makes it clear that the
prosecutor's duty of disclosure is operative even in the absence
of a request. 72  Where relevant evidence is not disclosed, rever-
sal hinges on the defendant's ability to show substantial materiality
and on the prosecution's ability to show in opposition that its fail-
ure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Reversal will not
be denied because the defendant failed to request disclosure of
65. Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369(1970); see Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) (plurality opinion); Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Compare United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d
573 (2d Cir. 1964), with United States v. Tomaiolo, 378 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
But see People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974)(sanction of dismissal for failure to disclose is not necessarily appropriate to the
circumstances).
66. United States v. Durgin, 444 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
945 (1971) (passive, unintentional failure to disclose unsubstantial material evi-
dence not grounds for reversal); Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), as
modified on denial of rehearing, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971) (due process
is violated only where false testimony is knowingly used by the state); United
States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1969) (where nondisclosure is passive, i.e.,
nondeliberate, courts may look to prejudice before granting new trial).
67. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972) ("due
process can be denied by failure to disclose alone"); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390
F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968).
69. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
70. Id. at 645, 527 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
71. 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1975).
72. Id. at 406, 534 P.2d at 1346, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 266. The supreme court
cited In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971),
as precedent for its view. See also People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 646, 527
P.2d 361, 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1974).
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such evidence.7
Second, such substantial material evidence must be disclosed
if there is only a "reasonable possibility" that it would be favorable
on the issue of guilt or innocence. 74  The court may indulge in
speculation to find that nexus, 75 and the defendant is favored by
a balance tipped in his interest.76
Third, the distinction between active and passive nondisclo-
sure (sometimes used to excuse the prosecution) is greatly re-
duced where the prosecution is required to exercise diligence and
good faith to make available pertinent information. 77  Passive
failure to act thus becomes an active fault.
Fourth, the requirement that evidence be substantial,
material and favorable to an accused is greatly mitigated by the
alternative of discovery7 and by constructions which make "favor-
able" to mean "useful in preparing a defense."79
Whether information is obtained by discovery procedure or
73. People v. Ruthford, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 408, 534 P.2d 1341, 1347, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 261, 267 (1975). Hitch held, however, that the sanction of dismissal is
not necessarily appropriate where the prosecution failed to disclose because of its
failure to preserve the evidence. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361,
117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974). It is unclear whether Ruthford overrules this distinc-
tion.
It is to the defendant's advantage, however, to make a request: knowing fail-
ure to honor the request is equivalent to suppression. See People v. Campbell,
27 Cal. App. 3d 849, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1972). Thus, while the prosecutor may
have no affirmative duty to gather materials for the benefit of the defendant, see
People v. Jenkins, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 115 Cal. Rptr. 633, as amended (1974),
where he makes a request and shows good cause, and the information is available
to the prosecutor but unavailable to the defendant, the prosecutor should obtain
it for him. See Engstrom v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 240, 97 Cal. Rptr.
484, as modified on denial of rehearing (1971), disapproved as to another point,
Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1974).
74. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 649, 527 P.2d 361, 367, 117 Cal. Rptr.
9, 17 (1974). Presumably, this would also apply to evidence material to punish-
ment and credibility since the prosecution's duty to disclose extends to such evi-
dence as well. People v. Ruthford, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 261 (1975).
75. Williams v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 412, 112 Cal. Rptr. 485, as
modified on denial of rehearing (1974).
76. People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 505 P.2d 537, 106 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1973).
77. See People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1974); People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 505 P.2d 537, 106 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1973); Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 464 P.2d 42, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1970); Engstrom v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 240, 97 Cal. Rptr. 484, as
modified on denial of rehearing (1971), disapproved as to another point, Hill v.
Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1974). But
see People v. Jenkins, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 115 Cal. Rptr. 622, as amended
(1974) (no police duty to obtain information merely to assist defendant).
78. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 27 Cal. App. 3d 849, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118
(1972).
79. Cf. United States v. Durgin, 444 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 945 (1971).
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by the workings of disclosure, the key premise common to both
is that the exchange of information is a necessary process if crimi-
nal justice is to be both fair and efficient. Chief Justice Burger,
while on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, wrote
in his dissent to Levin v. Katzenbach ° that it is the "superiority
of the prosecution's facilities for fact-gathering" that is the basis
for the duty to disclose. If, as the United States Supreme Court
held in Wardius v. Oregon,8 fundamental fairness requires
reciprocal discovery, then both discovery and disclosure begin to
merge into a single function which adjusts "the balance of forces
between the accused and his accuser."82  Whether initiated by a
defendant's request for discovery or by the prosecutor's sense of
duty, information must be exchanged so as to transform the su-
periority of the prosecution's means into the balance of resources
necessary to enable the defendant to secure a fair trial.
FUNCTIONS OF THE 'PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
As recently as 1921, the preliminary examination was dis-
missed as "a relic of pioneer conditions" which served but a
limited purpose where a defendant was provided a speedy
trial.8 3  Since then, perhaps because a speedy trial has not been
provided, the "relic" has grown to the point that in 1968 roughly
80 percent of all criminal trials in Los Angeles County were based
on submission of the transcript of the preliminary without further
evidence.8 4 Nationally, over 90 percent of all cases do not come
to trial at all, but are resolved prior to trial by plea bargain or
other means.8" The focus of criminal justice has shifted from trial
to pretrial procedures, and from adversary to administrative dis-
position of cases. The reforms of criminal justice, however,
have been directed to the trial process, leaving the vast majority
of defendants, who never come to that stage, bereft of those bene-
fits.
The preliminary examination is the keystone of this admini-
strative system. Since, as will be shown, discovery at or before
the preliminary must be premised on a need pertinent to the func-
80. 363 F.2d 287, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., dissenting).
81. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
82. Id. at 474.
83. Harley, Detroit's New Model Criminal Act, 11 J. CluM. L. & GRIM. 398,
405 (1921).
84. Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 635, 638 n.5 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Graham & Letwin].
85. Friedman, Some Jurisprudential Considerations in Developing an Ad-
ministrative Law for the Criminal Pre-Trial Process, 51 J. URBAN LAW 433, 434
n.6 (1974), citing THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967).
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tions of the preliminary, some of these functions should be made
clear.
The Statutory Function
The preliminary examination was established by the legisla-
ture to serve a simple and limited function: to hold a defendant
to answer if "it appears from the examination that a public offense
has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe the
defendant guilty thereof. . . ,,s6 The standard of proof is low,
and the process would seem likely to be routine:
"Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or
prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously enter-
tain a strong suspicion of guilt of the accused." An informa-
tion will not be set aside or a prosecution prohibited if there
is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an
offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.87
The purpose of the preliminary is to weed out groundless or
unsupported charges and to relieve the accused of the degradation
and the expense of a criminal trial. 8 To this end the defendant
is accorded the right and opportunity to protect his name from
being maligned at the preliminary examination by granting him
the power to exclude observors, to cross-examine witnesses, to at-
tack and to attempt to overcome the prosecution's case, to present
any affirmative defenses, and to raise and litigate fully all legal
and factual issues relevant to the preliminary examination. 9 It
is a fully adversary proceeding. 90
86. CAL. PEN. CODE § 872 (West 1970).
87. Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 471, 474, 432 P.2d 197, 199, 62
Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 (1967) (citations omitted).
88. People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 504, 354 P.2d 225, 229, 6 Cal. Rptr.
753, 757 (1960); Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (1941).
89. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304, 59 Cal. Rptr.
440 (1967) (power to cross-examine; present affirmative defenses; overcome the
prosecution's case); People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr.
753 (1960) (right to protect name from malignment; right to exclude public from
courtroom); Levy v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 3d 427, 107 Cal. Rptr. 384
(1973) (power to fully litigate issues); CAL. PEN. CODE § 868 (West 1970) (ex-
clusion of public at defendant's request).
90. The United States Supreme Court has lately distinguished such statutory
proceedings from a constitutionally required, but non-adversary "Fourth Amend-
ment probable cause determination." Holding in Gerstein v. Pugh, 95 S. Ct. 854(1975), at 863, that "the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest,"
the Court refused to require also an adversary setting and appointment of counsel.
Although many states do require such safeguards, the Court found that the stand-
ard of proof they required approached "a prima facie case of guilt," and these
safeguards were "not essential for the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 866. Since such probable cause can be deter-
mined by informal procedures, "the full panoply of adversary safeguards" would
serve only to overburden the criminal justice system and to exacerbate the problem
1975]
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While the magistrate's role theoretically is limited to
determining sufficient or probable cause,
[w]ithin the framework of his limited role, however, the mag-
istrate may weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and give or
withhold credence to particular witnesses. In other words, in
assisting him in his determination of "sufficient cause," the
magistrate is entitled to perform an adjudicatory function akin
to the functions of a trial judge. Yet the proceeding is not
a trial. .... 9.
It is a proceeding intended to be "shorter, less expensive and far
less complex" than a trial,9" "ordinarily a much less searching
exploration into the merits of a case. . . ."' Though the pre-
liminary furnishes the defendant with his most important discovery
opportunities, the typical preliminary in Los Angeles was found
to last about thirty to forty minutes, less than half of which was
accounted for by defense cross-examination. 4
It seems clear, however, that the pressure that has revived
the preliminary cannot be accounted for by the limited statutory
function it is designed to serve. Indeed, since most defense
attorneys, rightly or wrongly, consider it to be folly to present a
defense at the preliminary, 95 the statutory function appears to be
more a matter of form than substance. If the significance of the
preliminary examination is to be accurately gauged, account must
be taken of its collateral functions. These collateral functions are
numerous, but among the most important are the opportunities af-
forded for discovery, the foundation provided for plea negotia-
tions, and the provision of a substitute proceeding in lieu of trial.96
of pretrial delay. Id.
The Court, however, let stand its decision in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970), that such a statutory preliminary hearing is a constitutional "critical
stage," requiring appointment of counsel in order to guard against "the high proba-
bility of substantial harm" otherwise presented. Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 867-
68. The California preliminary is such a "critical stage," and the adversary con-
text afforded by California law is at least partly required by the United States
Constitution as well.
See text accompanying notes 154-158 infra for further discussion of the case
and its effect on California preliminary examination procedure.
91. People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 667, 511 P.2d 609, 612, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 657, 660 (1973) (footnote omitted).
92. People v. Iocca, 37 Cal. App. 3d 73, 79, 112 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105 (1974).
93. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 660, 451 P.2d 422, 426, 75 Cal. Rptr.
782, 786 (1969) (emphasis omitted), rev'd sub nom. Green v. California, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968).
94. Graham & Letwin, supra note 84, at 916, 922 n.432.
95. Id. at 635, 700.
96. Id. at 916. A key function of the preliminary not discussed here is liti-
gation of important constitutional questions on which conviction may turn. These
include, for example, validity of searches and seizures, probable cause to arrest,
violations of the Miranda warning rules, and so on. For a full discussion of these
and other functions, see Graham & Letwin, supra note 84, at 916-57.
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The Discovery Function
The preliminary examination now serves an important dis-
covery function. It gives the defendant a look at the prosecution's
case, allows him to assess the strength of his defense, and is the
only opportunity he has prior to trial to question the prosecution's
witnesses under oath. Since California has no compulsory deposi-
tion mechanism for criminal discovery,97 the opportunity to cross-
examine the prosecution's witnesses, to impeach or "freeze" that
version of the facts, and to ferret out elusive information is ex-
tremely valuable to the defense.
To some extent, the preliminary examination serves the
function of a deposition mechanism, but its utility is nonetheless
limited since the basic purpose of the preliminary is only to de-
termine probable cause to hold the defendant to answer. 98
Defense questioning might establish a factual basis for later pre-
trial discovery, for example, by disclosing the existence of other
witnesses whose statements could be sought by discovery motion,
but questioning aimed primarily and transparently at obtaining
information for later use at trial can be summarily cut off, and
the cases have uniformly denied any remedy. 99
Two recent cases, however, seem to suggest that through its
"inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice
so demand" the trial court may, in its discretion, compel discovery
by deposition. 900 The California Supreme Court has never actu-
ally rejected the use of depositions, but lower courts have been
reluctant to exercise their inherent power, and have flatly refused
to apply the civil deposition statutes to criminal discovery.' 0'
The supreme court finally considered the question in the
1974 case of Pitchess v. Superior Court,10 2 but confined itself to
ruling that the civil discovery statutes do not apply in criminal pro-
ceedings. Nevertheless, taken together with the suggestion made
by the court of appeal in People v. Bowen'08 that the trial court
"might well have issued a subpoena" to compel "attendance at a
97. See note 42 supra.
98. See Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 471, 432 P.2d 197, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 581 (1967); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 871, 872 (West 1970).
99. See, e.g., Tupper v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 263, 331 P.2d 977 (1958);
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 48 (1958); People v. Su-
perior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 694, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968).
100. See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 536-37, 522 P.2d 305, 308,
113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974); People v. Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 281, 99
Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (1971), as modified (1972).
101. E.g., Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191
(1961).
102. 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
103. 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 281, 99 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (1971), as modified
(1972).
1975]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
session in chambers," the Pitchess court left the door to court-
ordered deposition firmly ajar:
Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in
California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the
course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is
a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guid-
ing legislation. A defendant's motion to discover is addressed
solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has in-
herent power to order discovery when the interests of justice
so demand. Allowing an accused the right to discover is
based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to
a fair trial and an intelligent defense in the light of all rele-
vant and reasonably accessible information.10 4
The difficulty with using the preliminary as a discovery
device or deposition substitute is that it strains both discovery and
the statutory purpose of the hearing to the disadvantage of both.
The pressure for discovery tends to stretch the probable cause
hearing beyond the limit of probable cause, while restriction to
probable cause compresses the opportunity for discovery within
bounds that allow less than fully adequate discovery. By severing
the two functions from each other, either by development of a
deposition mechanism, or by affording discovery before the pre-
liminary, the effectiveness of both functions could be enhanced.
The Bargain Function
Given a system where 90 percent of all cases are resolved
prior to reaching the trial court, 105 commitment today is not usually
a prelude to trial but to plea negotiation. It is not the purpose
of this comment to argue the merits of such a system, but simply
to point out that it exists and is indispensable to the administration
of justice today. Whatever the merits, the preliminary examina-
tion serves the function of laying a foundation for plea negotiation
and administrative disposition of cases.
The preliminary serves this function by recording the facts,
testing the credibility of witnesses, and providing a means to assess
the strength of the case. Equipped with this knowledge, each side
can make an intelligent assessment of its position and come to a
swift and realistic conclusion.
It may appear inconsistent to suggest that a defendant who
pleads guilty should be afforded the opportunity to search out such
strengths and weaknesses of the case against him. After all, if
104. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 522 P.2d 305, 308, 113
Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974) (citations omitted).
105. See note 85 supra.
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he is not guilty or wants to contest the prosecution, he can go to
trial and find his remedy there. But the system cannot realisti-
cally afford this option for more than a few defendants. As a re-
suit, a defendant is subjected to great pressures and incentives to
agree to a guilty plea, and for the best of motives it may be made
greatly to his advantage to forego a trial. The truncated legal
process he undergoes may be made more palatable by the very
wide range of alternatives which plea negotiations can encompass.
For example, pre-plea discussions in the judge's chambers
may result in alternatives to prosecution, such a diversion under
the California drug-diversion program;"0 6 changes in how the of-
fense is charged, both as to degree 10 7 and the substantive offense
itself; probation, perhaps including arrangements for jail only on
weekends; opportunity to modify the terms or period of probation
should the defendant meet specified conditions or perform well
under a work furlough program; deals as to amount of fine, length
of sentence, or type of jail or prison facility to which the defendant
may be sent; striking or avoiding "enhancement" or "aggravation"
factors such as "habitual criminal" status, 10 8 "arming" and "use"
clauses, 109 and prior convictions; 110 concurrent rather than con-
secutive sentences;"' or commitment as a mentally disordered
sexual offender.. 2 or narcotics addict," 3 and thus eligibility for
treatment, rather than mere confinement as a felon.
This enormous discretionary power can have extreme im-
pact. For example, a criminal act charged as manslaughter could
draw a sentence of from six months to five years; the identical
act, if charged as first degree murder, could result in death or life
imprisonment upon conviction. 4 The median time served in
prison before parole varies from 36 months for manslaughter to
167.5 months for first degree murder." 5  If the evidence against
him is strong, a defendant may not want to take the chance of
trial and risk the danger of heavy penalty.
But unless discovery of all relevant evidence is afforded at
a time when such evidence can be fully evaluated in the adversary
setting of the preliminary, a defendant may enter these vital plea-
106. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1000 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
107. See id. § 1192 et seq.
108. See id. §§ 644, 3047 et seq. (West 1970).
109. See id. §§ 969c et seq., 3024, 12021, 12022 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
110. See id. §§ 644, 666-67, 969 et seq. (West 1970).
111. See id. § 669.
112. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6300 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
113. See id. §§ 3050 et seq., 3100 et seq. (West 1972).
114. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 190, 193 (West Supp. 1974).
115. Health and Welfare Agency, California Dep't of Corrections, Number
and Time Served in Prison Before First Parole 1 (February 26, 1974) (unpub-
lished report on file at the SANTA CLARA LAWYER).
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bargain negotiations severely handicapped. Where genuine know-
ledge of the strength and weaknesses of each side's case is lacking,
the negotiations are less a matching of offense to appropriate
penalty as they are a poker game where bluff and supposition de-
termine the outcome. Such a result is unfair and inefficient.
The preliminary now serves to lay a foundation for pretrial
disposition of cases. That fact should be admitted, and the narrow
conception that the preliminary is but a precursor of trial should
be abandoned. By affording earlier discovery, the plea-bargain
function can be made fair and effective. 116
The Trial Function
Since in the great majority of instances a defendant's case
is likely to be settled before trial, probably by plea bargain, the
preliminary examination may well represent the defendant's only
real chance to be heard, to contest the prosecution's charge, and
to have evidence weighed by a neutral magistrate. 117  The pre-
116. See, e.g., Tjoflat, The Omnibus Hearing: The Jacksonville Experience, 12
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 357 (1974) for a discussion of the benefits obtained by earlier
discovery in the federal system. But see Nimmer, A Slightly Moveable Object-
A Case Study in Judicial Reform in the Criminal Justice Process-The Omnibus
Hearing, 48 DENVER L.J. 179 (1971).
117. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1204 (West Supp. 1974) gives every defendant before
imposition of sentence the right to present or contest circumstances which mitigate
or aggravate the punishment. He has the right to be present at sentence, and
to confront the witnesses against him before sentencing. See People v. Ward, 105
Cal. 652, 39 P. 33 (1895); People v. Valdivia, 182 Cal. App. 2d 145, 5 Cal. Rptr.
832 (1960); People v. O'Brien, 122 Cal. App. 147, 9 P.2d 902 (1932); People
v. Giles, 70 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 872, 161 P.2d 623 (Super. Ct. 1945).
However, it is unlawful for the judge to acquire information about the defend-
ant except by evidence received at trial or otherwise before the court, CAL. PEN.
CODE §§ 1203, 1204, 1204.5 (West Supp. 1975); by the probation officer's report(which may, and perhaps must, contain hearsay of the rankest kind), see People
v. Gelfuso, 16 Cal. App. 3d 966, 94 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1971); People v. Valdivia,
supra; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203 (West Supp. 1975); and by evidence presented at
the section 1204 hearing. See People v. Valdivia, supra; People v. Escobar, 122
Cal. App. 2d 15, 264 P.2d 571 (1953); People v. Giles, supra. Thus, where trial
is waived as the result of a plea bargain, the only legal hearing, other than the
preliminary, at which the defendant may confront witnesses against him and con-
test information given to the court about him is the "1204" hearing. See, e.g.,
People v. Gelfuso, supra; People v. Valdivia, supra; People v. Escobar, supra.
Unfortunately, the "1204" hearing is little known and used less. Further, the
very fact that a plea bargain has been made makes any demand for a subsequent
adversary hearing under section 1204 more improbable. The hearing is subse-
quent to a determination of guilt and its utility as a discovery mechanism, or aid
in the preparation of an effective defense, or aid to enable intelligent plea negoti-
ations comes too late. Even were new evidence to be discovered by the hearing,
courts look upon such claims with distrust and disfavor and will rarely grant a
new trial or set aside a plea on the basis of new evidence. See, e.g., In re Weber,
11 Cal. 3d 703, 523 P.2d 229, 114 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1974) (habeas corpus; evidence
must "completely undermine the entire structure of the case on which the prosecu-
tion was based," be "conclusive," and "[point] unerringly 'to innocence"); In re
Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969); In re Lindley,
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liminary may furnish his only opportunity to confront and cross-
examine his accusers in the hope of impeaching them, and to pre-
sent exonerating evidence.
Again, to lay stress on this function may appear inconsistent
with the defendant's plea of guilty. But as has been noted
earlier,118 there are many reasons why a defendant may choose
to plead guilty, and his choice may not have been wholly free of
coercion. Nor is the impetus to avoid trial the defendant's alone.
Both sides want to avoid a trial if something else will suffice, but
the bargain they strike does not act unilaterally against the defend-
ant. It takes two to bargain, and both parties gain and lose. It
is not inconsistent for a defendant to plead guilty and yet still want
to preserve his "day in court" and opportunity to defend himself.
That opportunity is his by right. Every defendant is entitled
to present at the preliminary an affirmative defense and to attempt
to overcome the prosecution's case. This "trial function" is no
mere theoretical notion, but a purpose and right established by
law' 19 independent of the prospect of a later plea of guilty.
Unfortunately for the great majority of defendants who never
come to trial, the opportunity the law guarantees seldom culmi-
nates in an effective defense. Justice Mosk wrote recently in
People v. Uhlemann:2 °
[Flew defendants charged with an offense are prepared for
an extensive adversary proceeding at the preliminary exam-
ination. They seldom know the nature and extent of the
accusatory evidence prior to its revelation at the preliminary
examination, and therefore are unable to rebut the evidence,
produce contrary evidence or even devise a theory of defense.
Yet with the exception of the preliminary, the operation of
the criminal justice system is for most defendants administrative
rather than adversary. Once "held to answer," a defendant's fate
is controlled by the pressure of the judicial calendar, considera-
29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918 (1947); People v. Clauson, 275 Cal. App. 2d 699,
80 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1969) (appeal; evidence when viewed objectively must be such
as to render different result probable on retrial); People v. Shepherd, 14 Cal. App.
2d 513, 58 P.2d 970 (1936).
Consequently, except perhaps in very rare cases, the preliminary hearing is
the only opportunity a defendant who has waived trial may have to confront his
accusers at a time when that right can be of substantial use to him.
118. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
119. See Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 440 (1967).
120. 9 Cal. 3d 662, 677, 511 P.2d 609, 619, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 667 (1973)
(Mosk, J., dissenting). See also People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 663, 451 P.2d
422, 428, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 788 (1969), rev'd sub nom. Green v. California, 399
U.S. 149 (1970): "[l]t is seldom that either party has had time for investigation
to obtain possession of adequate information to pursue in depth direct or cross-
examination."
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tions of probation or alternative charges, negotiations between his
representative and the prosecution, by any number of considera-
tions other than trial on the evidence. And even at the prelimi-
nary the defendant is hampered by procedural rules-not the least
of which is the limitation on pre-preliminary discovery-from pre-
senting an effective and competent defense against his accusers.
For example, when the preliminary is substituted for trial the
prosecutor can put on his case, expose his witnesses, and preserve
their testimony unhampered by the thorough cross-examination
that discovery might have afforded at trial. Whatever discovery
the defendant might have obtained is strictly by the good grace
of the prosecutor, who has power-and exercises that power-
to provide it as suits his purposes. 2' In usual practice, discovery
for the purposes of the preliminary hearing is not subject to the
discretion or intervention of the magistrate, but is controlled by
the prosecutor alone. Though all rules of evidence apply to pre-
liminary hearings in California, 122 the prosecutor is hindered by
no jury and is aided by the generally unprepared state in which
most defense attorneys find themselves at the preliminary. 23  He
is also aided by a virtually unreviewable judicial discretion to cut
off defense questioning that "wanders" from the commitment
issue.' 24 He can, to a great extent, control the sentence the
accused will receive, by bargaining either as to degree or as to
how the offense will be charged. The standard of proof that he
must meet is only that of a "strong suspicion of guilt.' 25 And if
he fails in even that meager task, he is permitted to "forum-shop"
after the preliminary is completed by dismissing the information
and refiling it before a more agreeable magistrate. 126
That a defendant could find such a procedure a "bargain"
speaks ill of his alternatives, and it is this fact that should partic-
ularly concern a judge who must rule on a motion for discovery
before the preliminary. The concern is occasionally expressed that
further expansion of a defendant's rights at the preliminary will
convert the preliminary into a second trial phase, giving the
accused double opportunity to avoid conviction, and greatly bur-
121. See, e.g., Conference Papers on Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33
F.R.D. 113, 116-22 (1963).
122. Graham & Letwin, supra note 84, at 635, 657 (1971).
123. Id. at 635, 654; 916, 923.
124. Id. at 916, 920-21.
125. Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 471, 432 P.2d 197, 62 Cal. Rptr.
581 (1967).
126. CAL. PEN. CODE § 999 (West 1970) provides:
An order to set aside an indictment or information, as provided in this
chapter, is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense.
See, e.g., Patterson v. Police Court, 123 Cal. 453, 56 P. 105 (1899) (fourth suc-
cessive preliminary hearing permitted).
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dening the judicial System by the imposition of a second expensive
and time-consuming layer of criminal process. 127  But it seems
more likely, in view of the small percentage of cases that actually
reach trial, that the pressure to expand the preliminary is pressure
not to create a second trial, but to reach a resolution based on
the evidence. Without the chance of making a defense at the pre-
liminary, most defendants are foreclosed from any trial.
Discovery is the key to effective defense. The preliminary
examination is the keystone of the pretrial process. The accused's
defense begins, and in many cases, ends, with the preliminary.
He needs discovery not simply for trial preparation, but for an ef-
fective and fair preliminary examination.
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DISCOVERY BEFORE THE PRELIMINARY
There is sufficient indication in both case law and literature
that the cross-examination now practiced at the preliminary is of-
ten inadequate to make a competent defense, and that this is due
in large part to the limits on discovery. The "[b]are existence
of an opportunity for cross-examination in a . . .proceeding sup-
plies only a limited indicator of the opportunity's adequacy.'
128
Among the qualitative factors are the time and opportunities for
preparation available to the defendant and his attorney.'29
Limited cross-examination at the preliminary may be a fre-
quent tactic of skilled defense lawyers, as well as the recourse of
less able counsel, but the cross-examination cannot be effective
unless the attorney has had an opportunity to prepare in the light
of all relevant facts then available.' As the California Supreme
Court stated in Jennings v. Superior Court, 3 the defendant's right
to be advised of the charges against him is illusory if he is denied
sufficient opportunity to prepare to meet such charges.
If the defendant is able to present effectively an affirmative
defense at the preliminary, or to attempt to overcome the prosecu-
tion's case, as is his right,1 2 he must be able to obtain discovery
127. See, e.g., People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 664, 451 P.2d 422, 428, 75
Cal. Rptr. 782, 788 (1969), rev'd sub nom. Green v. California, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); Note, Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure,
83 YALE L.J. 771, 779 (1974).
128. People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474
(1967).
129. Id.
130. See Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 803, 478 P.2d 26, 29, 91
Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (1970); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1,
13 (1957); People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1967).
131. 66 Cal. 2d 867, 876, 428 P.2d 304, 310, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 446 (1967).
132. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304, 59 Cal. Rptr.
440 (1967).
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at or before the preliminary examination. California criminal law
allows that discovery, provided that the defendant's motion is
properly framed and a need pertinent to the preliminary estab-
lished.
The Discovery Issue Can Be Raised
A review of cases dealing with discovery at or before the pre-
liminary shows that discovery is an issue that can properly be
raised in relation to the preliminary. The supreme court held in
Theodor v. Superior Court:...
The issue of disclosure 3 4 was properly raised at the prelimi-
nary hearing. "The reasons that require disclosure at the
trial also require disclosure at the preliminary hearing, for the
defendant has the right at such hearing to cross-examine the
prosecution's witnesses and to produce witnesses in its own
behalf. The exercise of these rights at the preliminary hear-
ing may enable the defendant to show that there is no rea-
sonable cause to commit him for trial and thus to avoid the
degradation and expense of a criminal trial."
However, discovery has been more frequently denied than
upheld. A review of the reasons put forward by the courts sug-
gests that this result is due to inappropriate "showing" and "justi-
fication." These cases thus indicate how a defendant must pro-
ceed in order to obtain discovery both at and before the pre-
liminary.
Need Must Relate to the Preliminary
In Tupper v. Superior Court"5 and Mitchell v. Superior
Court,' the supreme court denied discovery at the preliminary
examination. It declined to presume that the trial court would
erroneously deny discovery before trial. In Mitchell, however, the
court conceded that discovery is required at the preliminary hear-
ing, but found it unnecessary to decide whether the defendant's
rights had been infringed. It did not appear to the court that
discovery had been demanded
to enable defendants to discredit the prosecution's evidence
at the preliminary hearing or. . . to use the informers as wit-
133. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 90, 501 P.2d 234, 243, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 235 (1972) (ci-
tations omitted), quoting Mitchell v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 827, 829, 330
P.2d 48, 49-50 (1958).
134. The court here is talking about discovery, that is information given to a
defendant in response to his motion and compelled by the court because in the
court's discretion that discovery is needed or justified. See text preceding note
9 supra.
135. 51 Cal. 2d 263, 331 P.2d 977 (1958).
136. 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 48 (1958).
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nesses at that hearing. .... The value to defendants of dis-
closure is that it might enable them to obtain information use-
ful in their defense at the trial.'8 '
Thus, a need related to the trial was found insufficient justi-
fication to compel discovery at the preliminary. Since need-for-
trial could be met by appropriate motion for discovery to the trial
court, the supreme court could not have found prejudice or the
denial of any substantial right.
In 1968, this distinction between need-for-trial and need-for-
preliminary was emphasized. The defense counsel in People v.
Superior Court (Simmons)38 had specifically sought a writ of
mandamus to compel a continuance of the preliminary and to
allow the preliminary to be used for purposes of discovery.
The court of appeal conceded that the defendant was entitled to
discovery of the items he sought, but held:
There is no reason, however, to turn a preliminary examina-
tion into a discovery proceeding where the defendant neither
shows that he has asked for statements made by him nor was
refused them.' 39
The defendant, the court said, did not contend the statements
are such as would "overcome the prosecution's case" as pre-
sented at the preliminary examination nor "establish an af-
firmative defense." He merely contends that as he is entitled
to such statements he is entitled to get them at the prelimi-
nary examination, although they were not an issue there.
140
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in denying what
it saw as a "fishing expedition," the court of appeal could find
no prejudice or denial of a substantial right, since the information
would have been available before trial and the commitment was
based on sufficient evidence. Further, the court said, "such a
blanket request without any specificity would have to be denied
." in any event.' 14
The court of appeal, in People v. Flemmings,14 2 recently re-
iterated these same grounds for denying discovery at the prelimi-
nary, but it very deliberately pointed out that discovery had been
denied because the defense counsel had not made an appropriate
showing, and not because discovery was per se unavailable. The
court cited Mitchell as pointing out two legitimate reasons for dis-
137. Id. at 830, 330 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
138. 264 Cal. App. 2d 694, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968).
139. Id. at 699, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 700, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
142. 34 Cal. App. 3d 63, 109 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1973).
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covery at the preliminary hearing: "(1) to show that there is no
reasonable cause to commit, and thus avoid a trial, and (2) to
prepare for trial."' 43  But here, the court said, defense counsel
had offered no evidence at all at the preliminary, he had not sug-
gested any intent to put on a defense in the magistrate's court,
he had been refused no opportunity, and he had not so much as
hinted at any theory of defense notwithstanding the evidence. On
the record before it, the court of appeal could not find that the
defendant was precluded from putting on a defense at the prelimi-
nary examination. The defendant's "purpose was discovery, for
possible use at the trial.'1 44 Thus, once again, the court was com-
pelled to find that the defendant was not prejudiced or deprived
of a substantial right "affecting the legality of his commitment. If
he is entitled to disclosure, his remedy now is a motion in the su-
perior court . . .,141
Discovery was allowed, however, in Theodor v. Superior
Court,46 where the supreme court found that a need pertinent
to the preliminary had been properly shown. The defendant in
Theodor had been denied discovery of the identity of an informer;
he had sought discovery to contest the probable cause of his arrest
and to use the informer as a material witness as to his guilt or
innocence. The supreme court denied discovery for the purpose
of attacking probable cause to arrest, but found that the defendant
had otherwise made adequate showing of a "plausible theory un-
der these circumstances," supported by adequate specificity.
No one knows what the undisclosed informer, if produced,
might testify. He might contradict or persuasively explain
away the prosecution's evidence. It is the deprival of the de-
fendants' opportunity of producing evidence which might...
result in their exoneration which constitutes the error in this
case, and we cannot assume that because the prosecution evi-
dence may seem strong that the undisclosed evidence might
not prove sufficient to overcome it .... 147
Nor was the court in this case able to say that subsequent
discovery by motion to the trial court would cure the prejudice
143. Id. at 68, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 664. This is a misreading of Mitchell. The
supreme court in Mitchell did state that discovery was available at the preliminary
to enable a defendant to show by cross-examination that there was no reasonable
cause to commit him for trial, but it suggested that the trial court would grant
discovery if necessary to assist the defendants in the preparation of their defense.
See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 48 (1958).
144. People v. Flemmings, 34 Cal. App. 3d 63, 69, 109 Cal. Rptr. 661, 664
(1973.) (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
147. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 88, 501 P.2d 234, 242, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 226, 234 (1972), quoting with approval People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App.
2d 653, 659, 315 P.2d 79, 82 (1957) (original emphasis).
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done to the defendant. By preventing the defendant from show-
ing at the preliminary that there was no reasonable cause to
commit him for trial, he was exposed to the degradation and ex-
pense of criminal trial.
1 4 8
Discovery Before the Preliminary
Although the need to prepare one's defense at the prelimi-
nary would by itself seem sufficient to justify discovery before the
preliminary, it has not been extended to the pre-preliminary
phase. Some support for an extension can be found, however,
in the recent cases of People v. Iocca49 and Gerstein v. Pugh.50
In locca, defendants were denied a continuance of the pre-
liminary to seek and produce an informer whose testimony was
necessary to substantiate an entrapment defense. The court of
appeal reasoned that while discretion as to continuances is usually
left to the trial court, such "'discretion may not be exercised in
such a manner as to deprive the defendant of a reasonable oppor-
tunity to prepare his defense . . . .' "11 Thus, where all evi-
dence indicated a potentially valid entrapment defense, the court
concluded that the defendants were deprived of a substantial right
by the denial of a continuance at the preliminary hearing.' 52
Considering that the preliminary must by statute be com-
pleted in one session unless the magistrate for good cause set forth
in an affidavit continues it,'" the need for discovery to investigate
and to prepare a defense for the preliminary must be strong if
its denial results in the denial of a substantial right. The "good
cause" found in Iocca to justify, indeed to compel, a continuance
ought also to justify discovery before the preliminary.
Similarly, in Gerstein v. Pugh,"' the United States Supreme
Court noted that failure to provide certain adversary safeguards
at a preliminary hearing such as that provided by California law
presents a "high probability of substantial harm.' 55  However, in
holding that "the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determi-
nation of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on
liberty following arrest . . . ,"'" the Court distinguished the in-
148. Id. at 90, 501 P.2d at 243, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
149. 37 Cal. App. 3d 73, 112 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1974).
150. 95 S. Ct. 845 (1975).
151. People v. locca, 37 Cal. App. 3d 73, 79-80, 112 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105
(1974), quoting Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 875-76, 428 P.2d 304,
309-10, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 445-46 (1967).
152. Id. at 80, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06.
153. CAL. PEN. CODE § 861 (West 1970).
154. 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
155. Id. at 868.
156. Id. at 863. See note 90 supra for further discussion of the decision.
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formal procedure required for that determination from the protec-
tion afforded by statute in many states and required by the Court
in Coleman v. Alabama.15 7
In Coleman, the Court said, the statutory preliminary was
characterized by "two critical factors": first, under Alabama law
its function was to determine whether the evidence justified
charging the suspect with an offense; and second, suspects were
allowed by Alabama law to confront and cross-examine prosecu-
tion witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Since "[t]he Fourth
Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to
pretrial custody . . . the high probability of substantial harm
identified as controlling. . ." is not presented.",8
Three facts should be noted. First, the California prelimi-
nary is a statutory and not a constitutional proceeding. Second,
the rights afforded a defendant in California, and the charging
function of the preliminary examination in California, mark the
preliminary as a constitutionally "critical stage" requiring at least
the appointment of counsel and perhaps certain other adversary
safeguards. Third, there is a "high probability of substantial
harm" to the constitutional rights of the defendant absent such
safeguards.
In view of this substantial risk, and the vital part that
discovery plays in the preparation of a defense within the charg-
ing function of the preliminary examination, it seems clear that
both "need" and "plausible justification" can be shown for discov-
ery before the preliminary.
"The reasons that require disclosure at the trial also require
157. 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing is a "critical stage" requiring ap-
pointment of counsel). The Court in Gerstein specified no procedure, but ruled
that
it must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as
a condition for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty, and this de-
termination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly
after arrest.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 95 S. Ct. 854, 868-69 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
Whether the California procedure which requires a judicial determination of
probable cause at a preliminary examination to be held within 10 days after ar-
raignment is sufficiently timely to meet this requirement is unclear. The San Jose
Municipal Court has chosen to foreclose any question by making at arraignment,
in all cases involving in-custody arrest, a judicial determination of probable cause
for detention pending the preliminary examination. The magistrate at arraign-
ment will review the police report, state for the record that he has reviewed the
police report, make a finding of probable cause to arrest and probable cause to
detain pending the preliminary examination, and insert the police report into the
court record. Interview with Honorable R. Donald Chapman, Judge of the San
Jose Municipal Court, in Santa Clara, April 11, 1975.
It should be noted that inclusion of the police report in the court file should
be of substantial aid to defense attorneys, and will obviate the necessity of seeking
it by discovery motions prior to the preliminary or trial.
158. Gerstein v. Pugh, 95 S. Ct. 854, 867-68 (1975).
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disclosure at the preliminary hearing, . . ." the California Su-
preme Court has twice stated, 15 9 and the reasons that required dis-
covery before trial ought also to require discovery before the pre-
liminary. Discovery was once an incident of trial itself, requiring
no more than a continuance where necessary to utilize effectively
information discovered during the trial.'60 But the court early
recognized both the inconvenience and the ineffectiveness of such
a process, and found that rights are illusory if the defendant is
denied adequate opportunity to prepare to exercise them.'
California law allows the defendant to present a defense at
the preliminary. Theodor and locca stand for the principle that
discovery is properly a part of an accused's defense, and concede
the importance of time in which to prepare that defense in the
light of all information obtained.
California criminal discovery procedure has reached the same
threshold that the courts once crossed with reference to discovery
at trial. The compelling logic that required them then to find the
exercise of legal rights to be inseparable from time for preparation
is equally compelling here. One would be hard-pressed to make
any rational distinction.
Other jurisdictions have found discovery before the prelimi-
nary to be beneficial to all parties.' 62 California should follow
the lead of other states 63 and extend discovery beyond the pre-
liminary examination.
CONCLUSION
Discovery in California is available only at the discre-
tion of the court. The courts in California have required a
defendant to show his need for desired information and to
state some plausible justification for the court to compel the
prosecution to reveal it. Discovery is available on such a showing,
both at and before the trial, and recent cases have made it clear
that it is also available at the preliminary examination, provided
that the need shown relates to the functions of the preliminary
rather than to trial. But the logic of need and utility has not yet
been extended to pre-preliminary discovery, though the inherent
discretion of the court appears sufficient to provide it.
159. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr.
226 (1972); Mitchell v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 48 (19.58).
160. People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
161. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304, 59 Cal. Rptr.
440 (1967); People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1967).
162. See Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J.
732 (1967), and articles cited note 116 supra.
163. For a model of a comprehensive criminal discovery scheme, see VERMONT
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 15, 16, 16.1, 16.2 and 17 (1974).
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California criminal discovery, by and large, has focused its
attention on the end result of the criminal justice system, the trial,
and has paid less attention to pretrial procedures and the treat-
ment of an accused during the pretrial phase. If the end was fair,
the means were presumed fair. But criminal justice should be
viewed as a process, the fairness of which should appear through-
out and not merely in the culminating phase. The new emphasis
on pretrial procedure has
had a Copernican impact upon the older dogma which
assumed the courtroom was the center of the decision-making
universe; today the role of the trial judge is more often seen
as simply a ritualistic validation of results determined else-
where. 1T
Those results are determined in large part by the discovery made
available at and before the preliminary examination.
As Justice Traynor wrote, "[A] sense of time in the law may
be no less important than a sense of place and . . . no two times
are alike."'" 5 An accused's defense begins when an accusation is
leveled. His ability to defend himself should be protected and
effected from that time forward.
David D. Salmon
164. Graham & Letwin, supra note 84, at 635, 638.
165. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 228, 246 (1964).
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